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Note
Legal Remedies for Employment-Related Sexual
Harassment
I. INTRODUCTION
Sexual harassment in employment is a severe problem that
has received little public attention and even less analytical
study. Although this form of harassment dates back to the ini-
tial entry of women into the marketplace,' it has only recently
become controversial. Only recently, too, have significant num-
bers of working women sought legal redress for the harms
caused by sexual harassment.2
Sexual harassment "can be any or all of the following: star-
ing at, commenting upon, or touching a woman's body; requests
for acquiescence in sexual behavior; repeated nonreciprocated
propositions for dates; demands for sexual intercourse; and
rape."3 In the employment setting, sexual harassment has
been defined as "unsolicited nonreciprocal male behavior that
asserts a woman's sex role over her function as worker."4 Em-
ployment-related sexual harassment is peculiarly threatening
because of the harasser's generally superior economic posi-
1. See L. FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARAssMENT OF Wo-
MEN ON THE JOB 34-44 (1978).
2. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir.
1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Heelan v. Johns-Manville
Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978); Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441
F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C.
1976), rev'd on other grounds sub hon. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
3. L FARLEY, supra note 1, at 14-15. Theoretically, either sex is capable of
engaging in sexual harassment. Undoubtedly, incidents of sexual harassment
other than that of a female by a male do occur. Sexual harassment, however, is
presently viewed by both commentators and women's groups as a problem
faced uniquely by women because of such factors as society's tendency to view
women as sex objects, the traditional male prerogative of sexual initiative, the
inferior economic standing of women workers, and male distaste of female par.
ticipation in the work force. See L. FARLEY, supra note 1, at 53; Meyers, Behind
Closed Doors, STUDENT LAW., Nov. 1978, at 45. This Note, therefore, will focus
on the common forms of sexual harassment suffered by women. Its analysis,
however, is clearly applicable to all forms of sexual harassment, whether heter-
osexual or homosexual, or perpetrated by males or females.
4. L FARLEY, supra note 1, at 15.
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tion.5 The problem is widespread6 and creates severe eco-
nomic7 and psychological8 difficulties for the women affected.
The outright demand for sexual favors made as a condition for
5. Working women earn substantially less than their male counterparts,
and- are concentrated in certain industries and occupations. For instance, in
1970, 40% of working males earned over $10,000 annually, and 70% earned over
$7,000. On the other hand, 45% of women working full time earned less than
$5,000 annually, and 74% earned less than $7,000. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORT, P-60, No. 80 (1971).
Job segregation is a pressing problem, as 52% of working women are em-
ployed at predominantly female occupations (occupations in which 70% or
more of the workers are female). This index of segregation has remained
nearly constant throughout the century; more than two-thirds of all working
women would have to change occupations in order to achieve an occupational
distribution similar to that of male workers. See Simmons, Freedman, Dunkle
& Blau, Exploitation from 9 to 5: Background Paper for the Twentieth Century
Fund Task Force on Women and Employment (1974), in B. BABcOcK, A. FREED-
MEN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAw: CAUSES AND
REMEDIES 192, 195-99 (1975).
More significant disparities between male and female employment status
appear when major occupational group figures are broken down. In 1971, over
60% of female white-collar workers (more than one-third of all women em-
ployed) held clerical positions, while almost 70% of male white-collar workers
(28% of working males) held managerial, professional, or technical positions.
In the same year, 43% of male blue-collar workers were craftsmen or foremen,
while only 8% of female blue-collar workers held similar positions. Id. at 196-
97.
6. In a survey of female civil service employees in New York, 70% of
those responding had experienced some form of sexual harassment on the job,
and 92% believed that it was a serious problem. See Nemg, Women Begin to
Speak Out Against Sexual Harassment at Work, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1975, at
38, col. 1. In another study, 49% of all women employed at the United Nations
reported sexual pressure on the job. Of those reporting sexual pressure, 21%
experienced it in connection with promotion. United Nations Ad Hoc Group on
Equal Rights for Women, Report on the Questionnaire xxxvi, cited in Com-
ment, Employment Discrimination-Sexual Harassment and Title VII, 51
N.Y.U. L. REV. 148, 149 n.6 (1976). See generally L. FARLEY, supra note 1, at 18-
21.
7. Victims of sexual harassment may be subjected to demotion, withhold-
ing of overtime, refusal to hire, and job termination. See L. FARLEY, supra note
1, at 15. Women who are fired, or who resign to escape severe harassment, may
lose accumulated fringe benefits and seniority rights. They also are forced to
endure a period of unemployment and must seek new work with an unfavora-
ble employment record. Sexual harassment also serves to maintain job segre-
gation, since it often discourages women from entering nontraditional jobs. See
id. at 45-89.
8. "All sexual harassment is a stressful experience and ego functioning
may well be seriously impaired. The victim is violated either physically or psy-
chologically and she experiences a loss of autonomy and control." L. FARLEY,
supra note 1, at 17 (quoting social psychologists Harriet Connolly and Judith
Greenwald; source not cited). Women who have been sexually harassed report
feelings of anger, fright, and defeat, diminished ambition, decreased job satis-
faction, impairment of job performance, and physical symptoms such as mi-
graine headaches and loss of appetite. See Working Women United Institute,
Sexual Harassment on the Job: Results of Preliminary Survey (1975) (on file at
the Minnesota Law Review).
[Vol. 64:151
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obtaining or maintaining employment is one of the most seri-
ous manifestations of sexual harassment. The courts thus far
have focused primarily on this type of behavior.9
This Note will examine a number of legal theories that can
be used to compensate victims of sexual harassment.10 Since
title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act" has provided the basis for
most litigation in this area, attention will first be directed to the
strengths and limitations of that Act. Next, certain common
law causes of action-assault, battery, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and breach of contract-will be analyzed as
possible methods of redress for sexual harassment. This Note
concludes that further statutory regulation is necessary, and
proposes a Model Statute designed to eliminate the inadequa-
cies of the current legal remedies relied upon by women who
have been sexually victimized on the job.
I. TITLE VII
The federal courts that first considered on-the-job sexual
harassment held that there was no cause of action for such con-
duct under title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.l2 The
landmark case of Williams v. Saxbe' 3 reversed this precedent
9. See text accompanying notes 17-27 infra.
10. The analysis in this Note contemplates two forms of sexual harass-
ment. The first occurs when a male uses his superior employment status to ex-
act compliance with his sexual demands, or to levy penalties for failure to
comply. Penalties for refusal may include negative job evaluations, poor per-
sonnel recommendations, demotions, disadvantageous transfers, withholding of
overtime, and termination. See L. FARLEY, supra note 1, at 15. The second form
of sexual harassment occurs when a female employee is subjected to a continu-
ous stream of harassment and sexual intimidation by her male co-workers.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
12. Tomldns v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas. Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976),
rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Garber v. Saxon Indus., Inc., 14 Empl. Prac.
Dec. 4896 (E.D. Va. 1976), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Garber v. Saxon Busi-
ness Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032 (4th Cir. 1977), Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390
F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated and remanded, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977);
Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 123 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd and remanded
sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
Title VII provides in relevant part-
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
13. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Wl-
liams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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in 1976. The Williams court held that the retaliatory actions of
a male supervisor, taken because a female employee declined
his sexual advances,14 constituted a form of sex discrimination
in violation of title VII.15 Subsequent decisions have followed
the Williams holding, and four circuits currently recognize a ti-
tle VII cause of action for sexual harassment.16 The issue has
not yet been addressed by the United States Supreme Court.
There are several problems with sexual harassment theory
as it is now applied by the courts. First, courts have narrowly
defined the factual contexts in which a title VII suit for sexual
harassment will be recognized. Second, courts have been re-
luctant to impose vicarious liability on employers for harass-
ment perpetrated by supervisory employees. Third, it is clear
that the remedies available to successful plaintiffs are inade-
quate. Finally, the conservative trend discernible in recent
Supreme Court decisions addressing other forms of sexual dis-
crimination may undermine the sexual harassment cause of ac-
tion altogether.
A. NARRoWLY DEFINED CAUSE OF ACTION
The courts that recognize a title VTI cause of action for sex-
ual harassment have all been presented with factual situations
that fit neatly into a narrowly defined sexual harassment para-
digm: the termination of a woman's employment for resisting
the undesired sexual requests of her male supervisor. The rule
that has evolved is that a plaintiff claiming sexual harassment
under title VII must show that acquiescence in her supervisor's
sexual demands was a term or condition of her employment.17
14. Plaintiffs complaint alleged that after she refused a sexual advance
made by her supervisor, she was subjected to a "continuing pattern and prac-
tice of harassment and humiliation .... including but not limited to, unwar-
ranted reprimands, [and] refusal to inform her of matters for the performance
of her responsibilities," and that her employment was terminated shortly there-
after. 413 F. Supp. 654, at 655-56.
15. Id. at 657.
16. See Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977);
Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Garber v. Saxon Business Prods., Inc., 552 F.2d 1032
(4th Cir. 1977). See also Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D.
Colo. 1978); Rinkel v. Associated Pipeline Contractors, Inc., 16 Empl. Prac. Dec.
5748 (D. Alaska 1978); Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D.
Mich. 1977).
17. See Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1046 (3d Cir.
1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Heelan v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1389 (D. Colo. 1978); Miller v. Bank of
America, 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp.
654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d
[Vol. 64:151
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The phrase "term or condition of employment" has been
interpreted to mean a "requirement."'8 For example, in Heelan
v. Johns-Manville Corp.,19 it was not the supervisor's frequent
sexual advances that violated title VII, but the termination of
the plaintiffs employment because she refused to acquiesce in
the advances. The courts interpreting "term or condition of
employment" as "requirement," however, have been faced with
fact situations in which employee's acquiescence was indeed a
requirement.20 It is thus unclear whether courts will apply the
sexual harassment theory to situations in which frequent and
emotionally disturbing sexual demands are made, but not as a
requirement for promotion or continued employment.
This uncertainty dilutes the force of the sexual harassment
cause of action. For example, a woman may suffer severe emo-
tional and physical harm because of a sexually coercive job at-
mosphere, even though her employment is not "conditioned"
on acquiescence to her supervisor's sexual demands. A coer-
cive atmosphere might result from frequent sexual advances
made by a supervisor who uses his economic advantage for lev-
erage. Such coercion might also stem from persistent harass-
ment by male co-workers who desire to keep a woman "in her
place."2 1 In both these situations, a title VII cause of action
would fail if "condition of employment" were interpreted to
mean "requirement."
It would certainly be an anomaly of statutory interpreta-
tion if courts adjudicating title VII sexual harassment claims
continue to apply such a narrow reading to the phrase "condi-
tion of employment." In other contexts, courts and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have liberally
construed "condition of employment" to refer to the overall
quality of the working environment.22 Thus, discriminatory
1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). This requirement follows from the language of the stat-
ute: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(l) ... to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his... terms [or] condi-
tions ... of employment, because of such individual's... sex. . . ." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2 (1976).
18. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047 (3d
Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
19. 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1390 (D. Colo. 1978).
20. See cases cited in notes 18, 19 supra.
21. See L. FARLEY, supra note 1, at 53.
22. See, e.g., Gray v. Greyhound Lines East, 545 F.2d 169, 174 (D.C. Cir.
1976); United Transp. Local 974 v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 532 F.2d 336, 340 (4th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 239 (5th
1979]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
conduct that degrades the quality of the working environment
or that creates an atmosphere of prejudice has been held to vi-
olate title VII.23 This liberal interpretation has been used to
prohibit the requirement that exaggerated courtesy be used by
blacks when speaking to white supervisors, 24 and has led to the
condemnation of the discriminatory practice of referring to wo-
men as "girls."2 5
The evil of such conduct is that it reinforces the victims'
perception of their subordinate social position. On-the-job sex-
ual harassment embodies the same evil. It reinforces the per-
ception that women should be subordinate and submissive, and
that their primary role should be sexual and maternal, not ag-
gressive and worldly.26
It is clear that courts must broaden their interpretation of
the "condition of employment" element to encompass the type
of on-the-job sexual harassment that results in poor working
conditions and loss of opportunities for advancement. Failure
to do so drastically limits title VI's efficacy as a remedy for
sexual harassment. Such a result would be inequitable since
"today employment discrimination is a complex and pervasive
phenomenon... the nuances and subtleties of [which] are no
longer confined to bread and butter issues." 27
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972); Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of
Educ., 418 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Ohio 1976), rev'd and remanded, 585 F.2d 192 (1978),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2053 (1979); E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 72-1114, 4 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 842, 843 (1972); E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 72-0779, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 317, 318
(1971); E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 72-0621, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 312 (1971); E.E.O.C.
Dec. No. 72-0591, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 309, 311 (1971); E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 70-
683, 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 606, 607 (1970). See also Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine
& Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Cf. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 210 (1964) (the contracting of plant maintenance work pre-
viously performed by employees of a bargaining unit is a term or condition of
employment within the meaning of § 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act);
Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 993, 1000 (7th Cir. 1978), affid, 99 S. Ct. 1842
(1979) (in-plant cafeteria and vending machine food prices have material and
significant impact on terms and conditions of employment).
23. In Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
957 (1972), the court noted, "The phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment' in Section 703 is an expansive concept which sweeps within its pro-
tective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged
with ethnic or racial discrimination." 454 F.2d at 238.
24. See E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 71-2042, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1102 (1971).
25. See E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 72-0679, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 441, 442 (1971).
26. See Note, Title VII: Legal Protection Against Sexual Harassment, 53
WASH. L REV. 123, 134-36 (1977); Comment, supra note 6, at 158.
27. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
957 (1972). Even if courts are willing to permit some expansion of the sexual
harassment cause of action under title VII, they may require a high level of
proof for establishing the existence of a sexually coercive atmosphere since
most courts have been reluctant to hold employers liable merely for their em-
[Vol. 64.151
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B. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
The scope of the title VII action for on-the-job sexual ha-
rassment has also been limited by the strict standard courts
have imposed for determining whether an employee's harass-
ing conduct will be attributed to his employer.28 Although
courts have announced a variety of standards for determining
the level of employer culpability required before vicarious lia-
bility may be imposed, in recent cases many employers are re-
leased from liability.
The courts in Barnes v. Costle29 and Heelan v. Johns-
Manville Corp.30 have adopted the most expansive measure of
employr liability, following a line of title VII decisions which
hold that an employer is chargeable with the discriminatory ac-
tions of its agents or supervisory personnel.31 The utility of
these holdings is limited, however, by the fact that both courts
ployees' abusive conduct. See Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 418
F. Supp. 743, 756 (W.D. Va. 1976), vacated and remanded, 561 F.2d 563 (4th Cir.
1977) ("[S]everal incidents of a white worker referring to a black worker in dis-
paraging terms does not amount to a Title VII case of discrimination."); Walker
v. Columbia Univ., 407 F. Supp. 1370, 1377 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("[Flrom time to time
residuary 'male chauvinism' on the part of individual employees has evidenced
itself. However, this does not make a pattern or practice chargeable to an em-
ployer and actionable by an employee."); Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co.,
369 F. Supp. 522, 537 (W.D. Pa. 1973), modified, 541 F.2d 394 (1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1041 (1977) (The court held that "defendant is not necessarily responsi-
ble for actions of all its employees in expressing or actively carrying out feel-
ings of hostility towards women," although employers are generally responsible
for actions of supervisory personnel). Courts, however, might be less reluctant
to recognize the discriminatory nature of a sexually coercive atmosphere if
they understood the debilitating effect such an atmosphere has on a female em-
ployee's ability to work at optimal capacity. See Comment, Sex-Title VII-
Cause of Action under Title VII Arises when Supervisor, with Employer's
Knowledge and Acquiescence, Makes Sexual Advances Toward Subordinate
Employee and Conditions Employee's Job Status on Favorable Response, 9 SE-
TON HALL L. REV. 108, 125 (1978).
28. If discriminatory conduct is not attributable to an employer, title VII
does not apply: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
.... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). One court, however, has suggested that "em-
ployer" under title VIE is an '"llustrative rather than exhaustive [term]," which
may embrace anyone who "controls access to ... employment." Sibley Memo-
rial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
29. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
30. 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978).
31. See Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir.
1975); McMullen v. Warner, 416 F. Supp. 1163 (D.D.C. 1976); Ostapowicz v. John-
son Bronze Co., 369 F. Supp. 522, 537 (W.D. Pa. 1973), modified, 541 F.2d 394 (3d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Tidwell v. American Oil Co., 332 F.
Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1971). See also Sibley Memorial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d
1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
1979]
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adopted the Miller v. Bank of America 32 rule that an employer
may be relieved of liability for sexual harassment perpetrated
by its supervisory personnel if three conditions are present:
(1) sexual harassment is contrary to company policy; (2) re-
sponsive internal grievance procedures have been established
to process complaints; and (3) the victim has failed to avail her-
self of these procedures. 3 3
Other courts have adopted far more restrictive rules.
Under the holding in Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co.,34 re-
covery against an employer is allowed only when the employer
fails to investigate a claim of sexual harassment and deal ap-
propriately with the offending personnel.35 The rule adopted in
Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co.36 is even nar-
rower. The court held that employer liability for sexual harass-
ment perpetrated by its employees exists only where the
employer had actual or constructive knowledge of the harass-
ment at the time of its occurrence. 37
The narrow holdings of these cases, because they insulate
employers from liability, are unjustifiable given the liberal con-
struction that generally has been accorded title VII.38 Broader
32. 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
33. Id. at 236 n.2. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1389 (D. Colo. 1978).
34. 441 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
35. Id. at 466.
36. 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
37. Id. at 1048. Accord, Price v. Lawhon Furniture Co., 16 Empl. Prac. Dec.
5785 (N.D. Ala. 1978).
38. See, e.g., Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 425 (8th
Cir. 1970); Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970);
Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784, 788 (N.D. Iowa 1975);
Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 507, 514-15 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
The term "employer" has been liberally construed to effectuate the pur-
poses of the Act. For example, in Curran v. Portland Superintending School
Comm., 435 F. Supp. 1063 (D. Me. 1977), the city of Portland was deemed the
plaintiffs employer for the purposes of her title VII claim even though she was
actually employed by the school system, and the city was prohibited by charter
from involving itself in the administration of the school system. See id. at 1073.
The city's only tie to the school system was its financial support of the schools.
In Puntolillo v. New Hampshire Racing Comxn'n, 375 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.H.
1974), the defendant Commission and the New Hampshire Trotting and Breed-
ing Association were both deemed employers of the plaintiff driver-trainer even
though driver-trainers were hired, fired, and paid by individual horse owners.
The defendant organizations were responsible only for licensing the driver-
trainers, and for assigning stall space at the tracks. Id. at 1092. See Sibley Me-
morial Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
If courts were to liberally construe the scope of employer liability for sex-
ual harassment claims arising under title VII, employers would not, of course,
be liable for every sexual advance made by one of their employees. Liability
would result only in those situations where a supervisor (or other employee
[Vol. 64.151
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application of a title VII analog to respondeat superior would
encourage employers to take steps to prevent sexual harass-
ment.39  Furthermore, the imposition of vicarious liability
would not necessarily be unfair even when imposed on employ-
ers that have attempted to put an end to harassment.40 The
fact that employees have brought title VII suits despite the
existence of internal grievance procedures 41 indicates that such
procedures may be ineffective, and that employees have little
confidence in them. Moreover, because employers profit from
bringing employees together in a work environment, it is rea-
sonable to hold employers liable for harm arising from the in-
teraction of employees.42 Finally, if there is no comprehensive
remedy in respondeat superior, victims of sexual harassment
might be left uncompensated simply because of their harass-
ers' financial status. It is clear that employers are better
equipped to bear the costs of their employees' sexually dis-
criminatory conduct.43
C. UNCOMPENSABLE DAMAGES
Title VII is an inadequate remedy for sexual harassment
for yet another reason: no punitive and only certain enumer-
ated compensatory damages are allowed by the Act. Title VII
relief may restore many of a harassment victim's tangible
losses; under the Act, courts are permitted to award reinstate-
with constructively similar authority) has abused his position, or where co-
workers have created a discriminatory employment atmosphere by subjecting a
female employee to persistant sexual invitations or intimidations. See note 7
supra.
39. No reason seems to justify relieving an employer of the minimal bur-
den imposed by Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra. If the Miller standard were adopted
by other courts, complaints would not be dismissed as a matter of law when a
company pled that it had established internal grievance procedures. It would
be a question of fact at trial whether an employer's grievance procedures were
effective and operated without creation of an unreasonable fear of reprisal.
Thus, a Miller-type standard would encourage employers to make something
more than superficial responses to sexual harassment problems.
40. An employer has been held liable for the discriminatory acts of one of
its supervisory personnel even when the upper-level management's record in
race relations was "exemplary." See Anderson v. Methodist Evangelical Hosp.,
Inc., 464 F.2d 723, 725 (6th Cir. 1972).
41. See Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976); text
accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
42. See text accompanying notes 117-119 infra.
43. But see Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 998-1001 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Mac-
Kinnon, J., concurring).
1979]
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ment, back pay, lost employment benefits, and attorney's fees.44
Damages for severe emotional and physical harm, however, are
not compensable.45
Courts have recognized that acts of discrimination may
cause their victims significant psychological harm. In
Humphrey v. Southwestern Portland Cement Co.,46 a title VII
suit for racial discrimination, the court allowed damages for
emotional anguish and loss of experience, concluding that the
purposes of the Act would best be served if all injuries caused
by discrimination were recompensable.4 7 The Humphrey suit,
however, was filed prior to a 1972 amendment to title VII that
altered section 2000e-5(g):
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in
the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action
as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, rein-
statement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable
by the employer, employment agency, or labor organization as the case
may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any
other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
4 8
The addition of the phrase "any other equitable relief' has
been interpreted to mean that Congress intended that tradi-
tional forms of legal relief, such as punitive and compensatory
damages,49 should not be awarded in title VII suits.0
44. See Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1391 (D. Colo.
1978). Courts have considered demands for back pay in title VII suits not as
"claim [s] for damages, but rather [as] an integral part of the statutory equita-
ble remedy." Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir.
1969). See also Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1973); Slack v. Havens, 522
F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 1975). Cf. Smith v. Hampton Training School for
Nurses, 360 F.2d 577, 581 n.8 (4th Cir. 1966) (back pay award in § 1983 civil rights
suit is an integral part of the equitable remedy).
45. See generally Note, Tort Remedies for Employment Discrimination
Under Title VII, 54 VA. L. REv. 491, 493 (1968).
46. 369 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 488 F.2d 691
(5th Cir. 1974).
47. 369 F. Supp. at 835.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
49. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1973); EEOC v. Detroit
Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 308 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 451
(1976); Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F. Supp. 1338, 1341-42 (D. Hawaii 1974).
50. See, e.g., Curran v. Portland Superintending School Comm., 435 F.
Supp. 1063, 1077-78 (D. Me. 1977); Wright v. St. John's Hosp., 414 F. Supp. 1202,
1205 (N.D. Okla. 1976); Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh Day Advent-
ists, 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1368-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Loo v. Gerarge, 374 F. Supp. 1338,
1341-42 (D. Hawaii 1974); Attkisson v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 5 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 917, 923 (S.D. Ind. 1972). This is contrary to the trend in many states that
allow the recovery of compensatory damages under their antidiscrimination
statutes. See, e.g., Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination v.
Franzaroli, 357 Mass. 112, 256 N.E.2d 311 (1970); Zahorian v. Russel Fitt Real Es-
tate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754 (1973); State Comm'n for Human Rights v.
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This approach has met with substantial criticism.5 ' In Loo
v. Gerarge,5 2 the court noted that traditional damage awards
would better effectuate the purpose of title VII by encouraging
private suits and deterring would-be discriminators. 53 Another
court, after determining that the plaintiff's teaching efforts had
been hindered by discriminatory working conditions, refused to
hold that the '"plaintiff may have a right but not a remedy."5 4
Since neither back pay nor reinstatement were appropriate in
that case, the court awarded the teacher $1,000 per working
year as compensation for the discriminatory working condi-
tions, deeming it "compensatory relief in furtherance of this
court's equitable power to make plaintiff whole."5 5 Such an ex-
panded construction of the court's equity powers, of course, to-
tally circumvents the statutory rule. Thus, it is more likely that
if any other courts do award compensatory relief beyond that
permitted by statute, they will do so only to the extent that it is
"incidental" to an award of equitable relief.56 In light of the ex-
press language of section 2000e-5(g), and the almost unanimous
Speer, 29 N.Y.2d 555, 272 N.E.2d 884, 324 N.Y.S.2d 297 (1971); Williams v. Joyce, 4
Or. App. 482, 479 P.2d 513 (1971); Anderson v. Pantages Theatre Co., 114 Wash.
24, 194 P. 813 (1921).
51. See Comment, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act-A Prayer for Dam-
ages, 5 CALIF. W.L. Rav. 252 (1969). See generally Note, Enforcement of Fair
Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 U. Cm. L. REV. 430 (1965);
Note, Tort Remedies for Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, 54 VA. L.
REv. 491 (1968).
52. 374 F. Supp. 1338 (D. Hawaii 1974).
53. Id. at 1341-42 & n.6.
54. Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 418 F. Supp. 603, 607 (S.D.
Ohio 1976), rev'd, 585 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2053 (1979).
55. Id. at 607.
56. This result has been reached in an analogous context. Under rule
23(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs may seek designa-
tion as a class where "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act
on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as
a whole." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (2). Courts have interpreted this rule to mean
that rule 23(b) (2) certification applies only to those situations where money
damages are not the relief sought. See LaMar v. A & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489
F.2d 461, 466 (9th Cir. 1973); Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D.
69, 102 (1966) (Advisory Committee note on proposed amendment to rule
23(b) (2)). Nevertheless, courts now permit classes certified under rule
23(b) (2) to bring claims for money damages, so long as the damages claimed
are "subsidiary" or "incidental" to the declaratory and injunctive relief sought.
See Society for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 528 F.2d 905, 906 (9th Cir.
1975) (per curiam); Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1100 n.17 (5th Cir. 1975);
Lynch v. Sperry Rand Co., 62 F.R.D. 78, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (sex discrimination
action brought under title VII).
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refusal of courts to award compensatory damages, it does not
seem probable that judicial action of this type can be relied
upon to alleviate the problem of inadequate relief for victims of
sexual harassment.57
D. CONSERVATIVE SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
A final problem with the cause of action for sexual harass-
ment that has evolved under title VII is that it may not survive
a challenge in the Supreme Court. In recent decisions, the
Court has adopted a narrow view of what constitutes "gender-
based" discrimination.5 8 This trend indicates that the Court
agrees with earlier lower court opinions which announced that
sexual harassment is "not the type of discriminatory conduct
contemplated" by title VII.59
The courts that have recognized the title VII cause of ac-
tion for sexual harassment have necessarily determined that
such conduct constitutes discrimination based on a proscribed
classification: sex.60 These courts have, as a general rule,
deemed the requisite "gender-based" variable present when-
ever a female employee has been sexually harassed, and male
employees have not 6 ' or would not have been 62 subjected to
57. A method for partially ameliorating this inequity was rejected in Van
Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Cal. 1973). The court refused
to allow plaintiff to amend his title VII complaint to include a pendent state
claim for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress. Id. at 840. Al-
though Congress has expressed its intent that title VII relief not include com-
pensatory awards, it does not necessarily follow that state remedies should not
be permitted to fill the gap. Allowing pendent state claims would, therefore, be
one method of expanding the relief available to victims of sexual harassment
who bring title VII claims.
58. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello,
417 U.S. 484 (1974).
59. Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 123, 124 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd
sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See Tomkins v. Pub.
Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d
Cir. 1977); Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975),
rev'd mem., 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
60. Title VII does not outlaw discrimination per se, but only discrimination
based on statutorily proscribed classifications such as sex or race. See, e.g.,
Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 520 F.2d 352, 357 (2d Cir. 1975);
Sek v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 421 F. Supp. 983, 992 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aFld mem,
565 F.2d 153 (3d Cir..1977); Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 384
F. Supp. 585, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 514 F.2d 767 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 427
U.S. 911 (1975).
61. See Munford v. James T. Barnes & Co., 441 F. Supp. 459, 465 (E.D. Mich.
1977); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 659 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
62. See Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1047 & nA (3d
Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Heelan v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978), the court acknowledged
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similar harassment. The rationale is that any consideration of
gender in employment decisions is proscribed by title VII. In
other words, since the victim would not have been sexually
harassed "but for" her sex, the harassment is gender-based dis-
crimination.63 A major problem with this "but for" rationale is
that it is likely it will be reversed by the Supreme Court. Gen-
eral Electric Co. v. Gilbert,64 a major title VII sex discrimina-
tion case, may foreshadow adverse treatment of sexual
harassment claims by the Court. In Gilbert, the Court held
that a disability plan that provided nonoccupational sickness
and accident benefits to all General Electric employees, but ex-
cluded any benefits for disabilities arising from pregnancy, did
not violate title Vii's ban on sex discrimination. 65 The Court
stated:
[The] insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligi-
bility because of gender but merely removes one physical condition-
pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities. While it is true
that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every
legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classifica-
tion .... 66
There are two aspects of the Gilbert decision that presage
a narrow construction of "gender-based" discrimination in the
sexual harassment context. First, the Court relied on its earlier
decision in Geduldig v. Aiello,67 a case factually similar to Gil-
bert. The lower court in Gilbert had expressly rejected the ap-
plicability of Geduldig because it had arisen under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment rather than
under title VII.68 The Supreme Court, however, quoted heavily
from Geduldig, concluding that decisions arising under the
that there was precedent for considering sexual harassment "gender-based"
discrimination, but adopted an alternative rationale, that sexual harassment
stems from women's stereotypical role as sexually accommodating. Id. at 1389.
63. See Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1388 (D. Colo.
1978).
64. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
65. Id. at 145-46.
66. Id. at 134 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974)).
67. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
68. Several other trial courts adjudicating title VII claims had also dis-
tinguished Geduldig, generally on the grounds that it was a constitutional deci-
sion, and had held that excluding pregnancy benefits from general disability
plans constitutes sex discrimination for the purposes of title VIL See Wetzel v.
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.), vacated, 424 U.S. 737 (1975);
Ziehy v. City of Philadelphia, 392 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Sale v. Waverly-
Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784 (N.D. Iowa 1975); Taylor Fed'n of
Teachers v. Board of Educ., 72 Mich. App. 304, 249 N.W.2d 399 (1976), vacated
and remanded, 400 Mich. 803, 258 N.W.2d 354 (1977).
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fourteenth amendment are "a useful starting point" in deciding
title VII cases, even though "there is no necessary inference
that Congress . .. intended to incorporate into Title VII the
concepts of discrimination which have evolved from court deci-
sions construing the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment."69 This conclusion is paradoxical since, in the
context of racial discrimination, the Supreme Court has
sharply differentiated between the standard required to prove
discrimination under title VII, and the higher standard re-
quired to prove discrimination prohibited by the fourteenth
amendment. 70 If the title VII and fourteenth amendment stan-
dards become blurred when sex discrimination claims are at is-
sue, it will become increasingly difficult to prove gender-based
discrimination under title VII, since the Court has refused to
adopt strict scrutiny analysis for challenges of gender-based
classifications. 7 1
The second important aspect of the Gilbert decision is the
mode of analysis adopted by the Supreme Court. As Justice
Brennan noted in dissent, the outcome of the case was largely
predetermined by the conceptual framework within which the
Court chose to examine the challenged disability benefits pro-
gram. 72 The plaintiffs had urged the Court to find a violation of
title VII because the omission of pregnancy from the list of cov-
ered disabilities had the intended result of leaving "only wo-
men [subjected] to a substantial risk of total loss of income
69. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 133 (1976).
70. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) with Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
71. In the sex discrimination context, the Supreme Court departed from
the traditional "rational basis" review in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), where
it subjected the challenged legislation to something more than minimal scru-
tiny. The zenith of the Court's review of sex-based classifications occurred in
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), where a four-member plurality
stated that sex-based classifications are "inherently suspect" and "must be
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny." Id. at 688. The view of the Frontiero plu-
rality, however, has never been adopted by a majority of the court, and equal
protection decisions since Frontiero have consistently fallen short of subjecting
sex discrimination claims to strict scrutiny analysis. See Califano v. Webster,
430 U.S. 313 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). See generally Johnston,
Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court 1971-1974, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 617
(1974); Lombard, Sex: A Classification in Search of Strict Scrutiny, 21 WAYNE
ST. L. REV. 1355 (1975); Comment, Kahn v. Shevin-Sex: A Less-Than-Suspect
Classification, 36 U. Prrr. L. REV. 584 (1975).
72. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 147-48 (1976) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (quoting Brief for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as
Amicus Curiae at 12).
[Vol. 64.151
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
because of temporary medical disability."73 The Court, how-
ever, chose to focus on the plan as a "gender-free assignment of
risks," attaching great importance to the fact that "there is no
risk from which men are protected and women are not. Like-
wise, there is no risk from which women are protected and men
are not."74 Thus, it concluded that the classification at issue
was not gender-based, but simply underinclusive "of the set of
risks that the State has selected to insure."75
If the conceptual framework of Geduldig were used in ana-
lyzing sexual harassment questions, the title VII cause of ac-
tion would disappear. Rationales reminiscent of Gilbert and
Geduldig have been used by several of the lower courts that
have dismissed sexual harassment complaints. For example, in
Tompkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co.,76 the court con-
cluded that no gender-based claim was made:
In this instance the supervisor was male and the employee was female.
But no immutable principle of psychology compels this alignment of
parties. The gender lines might as easily have been reversed, or even
not crossed at all. While sexual desire animated the parties, or at least
one of them, the gender of each is incidental to the claim of abuse.77
This reasoning ignores the fact that the plaintiff would not have
been subjected to harassment but for her sex,78 just as the
plaintiffs in Gilbert would have received total coverage for all
potential risks but for their sex.7 9
In Barnes v. Train,8 o the court found that no sex discrimi-
73. 429 U.S. at 147 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 135 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974)).
75. 429 U.S. at 140. The rationales of Gilbert and Geduldig have been
sharply criticized. See Note, The Impact of Geduldig v. Aiello on the EEOC
Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, 50 hIN. L.J. 592 (1975); 52 J. URn. L 591
(1974).
Dissenting in Gilbert, Justice Brennan stated that "it offends common
sense to suggest ... that a classification revolving around pregnancy is not, at
the minimum, strongly 'sex related."' General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
149 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977).
77. 422 F. Supp. at 556.
78. See text accompanying notes 60-63 supra.
79. This criticism is not weakened by attempts, such as that by the
Supreme Court in Gilbert, to differentiate pregnancy from other covered medi-
cal disabilities on the basis that pregnancy is voluntarily contracted. The dis-
trict court in Gilbert found that "a substantial incidence of negligent or
accidental conception ... occurs." General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125,
151 n.3 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). This finding substantiates the argu-
ment that "but for" an employee's female gender, she would not be vulnerable
to any period of uncompensated disability due to pregnancy.
80. 13 Fair EmpL Prac. Cas. 123 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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nation was present where the plaintiff had been fired for re-
sisting her supervisor's sexual advances. The Barnes court
reasoned, "The substance of [the appellant's] complaint is that
she was discriminated against, not because she was a woman,
but because she refused to engage in a sexual affair with her
supervisor."81 This rationale separates employees into two
classifications, those who are sexually harassed and those who
are not, with the latter classification composed both of males
and females. Such reasoning is functionally identical to the ra-
tionale employed by the Supreme Court in Gilbert, which held
that the challenged disability plan was not gender-based since
its potential recipients were divided into two groups: pregnant
women and nonpregnant persons. 82
The Gilbert decision, although indicative of the Supreme
Court's posture toward claims of gender-based discrimination
under title VII, is certainly not controlling precedent for suits
involving sexual harassment. Gilbert can, of course, be distin-
guished on its facts. But it also should be read in light of a sub-
sequent Supreme Court decision, Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty.83
In Satty, the Court did not retreat from its position that distinc-
tions based on pregnancy are not gender-based, but it did hold
that an employer's practice of depriving women on pregnancy
leave of their accumulated seniority had a prohibited discrimi-
natory effect.84 It seems, therefore, that if plaintiffs in a test
case could provide the Supreme Court with sufficient empirical
evidence that sexual harassment is largely male behavior di-
•rected at females, the Court could conclude that such conduct
has a discriminatory effect on women. Discriminatory effect
might be established more easily when there is evidence that a
supervisor has made advances to several employees, all of
whom were female.8 5 It should also be noted that much of Gil-
bert's precedential value was destroyed by a 1978 amendment
to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provided that distinctions
based on pregnancy constitute sex discrimination violative of
81. 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 124.
82. 'The program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant
women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female,
the second includes members of both sexes." General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429
U.S. 125, 135 (1976) (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974)).
83. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
84. Id. at 140-41.
85. See Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), rev'd
mem., 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
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title VII.86 This amendment is a clear indication of Congress'
intent that courts should not take a narrow view of the forms of
conduct that constitute gender-based discrimination.
The appellate courts that have recognized a cause of action
for sexual harassment have adopted an appropriate conceptual
framework for examining the problem, properly noting that it is
the victim's gender that prompts the harasser's attention. One
district court has urged that since sexual stereotyping of the
kind title VII was meant to eradicate is at the root of a har-
asser's conduct, sexual harassment should be within the pur-
view of the Act.87 Thus, despite the Supreme Court's
conservative stance on gender-based discrimination, there are
compelling rationales for justifying a cause of action under title
VII for sexual harassment.
II. THE COMMON LAW REMEDIES
Since title VII fails to provide a wholly satisfactory remedy
for employment-related sexual harassment, alternative reme-
dies must be devised. Certain common law doctrines provide
realistic alternatives for compensating victims of sexual harass-
86. Act of Oct. 1, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (amending 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)).
87. See Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Colo. 1978).
The Heelan court noted, "the stereotype of the sexually-accommodating secre-
tary is well documented in popular novels, magazine cartoons and the theatre."
Id. at 1390. The Supreme Court has also noted this dimension of sex discrimi-
nation, stating that it is "one of the most insidious of the old myths about
women-that women, wittingly or not, are seductive sexual objects." Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 345 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
It is well-established that "the primary thrust of [title VII] was to discard
outmoded sex stereotypes posing distinct employment disadvantages for one
sex." Knott v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 527 F.2d 1249, 1251 (8th Cir. 1975); accord,
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 328 (1977); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971); Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d
711 (7th Cir. 1969). Therefore, judicial recognition of the dominant role sexual
stereotyping plays in instances of sexual harassment would certainly bring
such misconduct within the purview of title VIL If courts were to recognize
that sexual harassment is a form of invidious discrimination rooted primarily in
a pervasive stereotype of women, and grounded the title VII cause of action on
this realization, an anomalous situation would result: sexual harassment per-
petrated by women against men would not be covered by the Act. Although
this situation is relatively unimportant since there is little observed incidence
of male victimization by females, it does suggest that the "stereotyping" theory
of sexual harassment is somewhat at odds with the "but for" theory discussed
earlier. See text accompanying notes 60-63 supra.
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ment. Specifically, three actions in tort-assault, battery, and
intentional infliction of severe emotional distress-as well as
actions for breach of contract, are potentially useful for this
purpose.88
A. BATrERY
Battery, usually defined as an "intentional and unpermit-
ted [contact) with the plaintiff's person,"89 is a remedy of obvi-
ous utility to victims of on-the-job sexual harassment. Such
harassment frequently involves physical contact to some de-
gree.90 Although the contact usually does not result in actual
physical harm, its offensive and insulting nature makes it ac-
tionable as battery.9 1
The range of compensatory relief available to victims of
battery is wide. Courts have allowed damages for resultant
physical injury, including pain and suffering, and reasonable
medical expenses.92 Moreover, damages have been allowed for
lost earnings and loss of earning capacity suffered as a conse-
quence of battery.93 And, most importantly for victims of sex-
ual harassment, courts have begun to award damages for the
humiliation, disgrace, degradation, and emotional distress that
often result from offensive contact.94 In certain cases, courts
88. See Note, Title VII: Legal Protection Against Sexual Harassment, 53
WASH. L. REV. 123, 136 n.62 (1977).
89. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 34 (4th ed. 1971).
90. A recent survey revealed that physical contact was present in 56% of
the cases where the survey respondents had reported incidents of sexual har-
assment. Working Women United Institute, Sexual Harassment on the Job: Re-
sults of Preliminary Survey, supra note 8.
91. See, e.g., Skousen v. Nidy, 90 Ariz. 215, 218, 367 P.2d 248, 249 (1960) (wo-
man recovered $3,500 actual damages and $1,500 punitive damages as a result of
her employer '"placing his hand upon [her] private parts ... and attempting to
seduce her"); Gates v. State, 110 Ga. App. 303, 138 S.E.2d 473 (1964) (battery
found where man slapped woman on buttocks). See generally W. PROSSER,
supra note 89, at 36.
92. See Bullock v. Tamiani Trail Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326, 332 (5th Cir.
1959); Johnson v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 241 So.2d 588, 593 (La. Ct. App.
1970); Baskin v. Tarver, 170 So. 2d 197 (La. Ct. App. 1964); McFadden v. Tate, 350
Mich. 84, 90-91, 85 N.W.2d 181, 183-84 (1957); Powell v. State, 19 Misc. 2d 9, 13, 119
N.Y.S.2d 846, 850 (1959); Garner v. State ex rel. Askins, 37 Tenn. App. 510, 522-23,
266 S.W.2d 358, 364 (1954); Houston Transit Co. v. Felder, 146 Tex. 428, 432-34, 208
S.W.2d 880, 882-83 (1948).
93. See Tollett v. Mashburn, 183 F. Supp. 120, 126 (W.D. Ark. 1960), affid,
291 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1961); Mobley v. Garcia, 54 N.M. 175, 178, 217 P.2d 256, 258
(1950).
94. See Bullock v. Tamiani Trail Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326, 332 (5th Cir.
1959); Jones v. Franklin, 139 Colo. 384, 387, 340 P.2d 123, 125 (1959); Earle v. Wil-
bite, 299 So. 2d 393, 394 (La. Ct. App. 1974); Squyres v. Phillips, 285 So. 2d 337,
339-40 (La. Ct. App. 1973).
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have allowed damages for emotional distress even when no
physical harm resulted from the battery.95
A tort action such as battery, which recognizes and pro-
vides compensation for the emotional harm resulting from
physical harassment, certainly can be useful in overcoming the
problem of sexual harassment. The battery action, however,
has only limited applicability to the wide spectrum of harmful
conduct that comprises this problem. Its primary limitation is
that liability for battery does not reach purely verbal harass-
ment. A second constraint is that even where harmful or offen-
sive contact has occurred, many of the resulting harms may not
be compensable under battery theory. Third, the battery action
is designed for circumstances in which the offensive contact is
a single incident involving some use of physical force. It is not
well-suited, therefore, to the situation where a supervisor or co-
worker who engages in a continual pattern of harassment at
some point commits a single battery, since the victim normally
can receive only those damages proximately caused by the bat-
tery. Thus, the economic 96 and emotional harm caused by a
harasser's prior conduct will not attach to the harm resulting
from a single battery such as a pat on the buttocks.97
95. See, e.g., Ware v. Dunn, 80 Cal. App. 2d 936, 183 P.2d 128 (1947); Gos-
selin v. Silver, 301 Mass. 481, 17 N.E.2d 706 (1938); Stowers v. Ardmore Acres
Hosp., 19 Mich. App. 115, 172 N.W.2d 497 (1969), affd sub nom. Stowers v. Wo-
lodzko, 191 N.W.2d 355 (1971); Cook v. Kinzua Pine Mills Co., 207 Or. 34, 293 P.2d
717 (1956). In Koch v. Stone, 332 S.W.2d 529 (Ky. 1960), the court noted, "Civil
liability has been upheld for taking improper familiarities with a female result-
ing only in fear, humiliation, or mental anguish without immediate physical in-
jury." Id. at 531. Accord, Edmisten v. Dousette, 334 S.W.2d 746 (Mo. App. 1960).
96. Although courts may award damages for lost earnings or loss of earn-
ing capacity resulting directly from a battery, see text accompanying note 93
supra, the economic losses suffered by victims of sexual harassment relating to
lost employment opportunities, unfairly withheld promotions, and voluntary
resignations are not compensable.
97. Proof of a pattern of sexual harassment preceding the battery, how-
ever, may be considered "aggravating circumstances" that justify punitive or
exemplary damages. Some jurisdictions deny punitive awards altogether. See,
e.g., McVay v. Ellis, 148 La. 247, 86 So. 783 (1921); Adams v. Strain, 80 N.H. 90,
113 A. 209 (1921). Others require a showing of malice. See, e.g., Vancherie v.
Siperly, 243 Md. 366, 221 A.2d 356 (1966); Walker v. Kellar, 226 S.W. 796 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1921). Furthermore, punitive damages are normally not allowed
where the battery was merely technical, with no actual force used. See W.
PROSSER, supra note 89, at 35. Thus, even when the harasser's aggravated pat-
tern of conduct causes emotional harm, the punitive damages remedy will
prove, at best, only partially sufficient.
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B. ASSAULT
The action for assault is another possible means for com-
pensating victims of sexual harassment. Assault is an "inten-
tional, unlawful offer to touch the person of another in a rude
or angry manner under such circumstances as to create in the
mind of the party alleging the assault a well-founded fear of an
imminent battery, coupled with the apparent present ability to
effectuate the attempt."9 8 An action for assault will lie where
an employee is subjected to words and actions that reasonably
would cause her to believe that an offensive contact is immi-
nent.9 9 A victim of assault may recover damages for fright, hu-
miliation, or other forms of emotional distress caused by the
defendant's misconduct.100
The limitations on the use of this action to combat sexual
harassment are similar to the limitations on the use of battery.
Although the assault cause of action reaches certain conduct
not involving harmful or offensive bodily contact, it provides a
remedy only for those damages that result directly from the
specific instance of assault. It therefore would not provide a
remedy for the emotional harm arising from prior patterns of
verbal intimidation that were unaccompanied by demonstra-
tions of physical force.101 Although a regular pattern of sexual
harassment undoubtedly creates a coercive, debilitating atmos-
98. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hill, 25 Ala. App. 540, 542, 150 So. 709, 710
(1933).
99. In State v. Allen, 245 N.C. 185, 95 S.E.2d 526 (1956), the defendant re-
peatedly stopped his car within a few feet of a woman and moved the lower
part of his body back and forth, creating a "reasonable apprehension that [he]
was planning to get out of his car and inflict upon her immediate bodily harm
to satisfy his lust." Id. at 189, 95 S.E.2d at 529. In Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Hill, 25 Ala. App. 540, 150 So. 709 (1933), the court found the requisite "reason-
able apprehension" where the defendant extended his hand toward the plain-
tiff, who was standing behind a four-foot-wide counter, and made suggestive
remarks.
100. See Ware v. Dunn, 80 Cal. App. 2d 936, 183 P.2d 128 (1947); Kline v.
Kline, 158 Ind. 602, 64 N.E. 9 (1902); Green v. Washington Suburban Sanitary
Comm'n, 259 Md. 206, 269 A.2d 815 (1970); Williams v. Underhill, 63 App. Div.
223, 71 N.Y.S. 291 (1901). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 89, at 38.
101. "Mere words" cannot amount to an assault if unaccompanied by some
show of physical force. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hill, 25 Ala. App. 540, 150
So. 709 (1933); Reed v. Maley, 115 Ky. 816, 74 S.W. 1079 (1903); Johnson v. Samp-
son, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926); Prince v. Ridge, 32 Misc. 666, 66 N.Y.S.
454 (1900). Where solicitations for sexual intercourse form the substance of an
assault claim, courts have often said that "it doesn't hurt to ask." See generally
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L.
REv. 1033 (1936). Thus, a supervisor's constant demands for sexual contact may
create serious emotional disturbances in the victim, yet such solicitations per
se are not actionable as assaults.
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phere, it probably does not create a reasonable apprehension of
imminent offensive contact.
C. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DIsTREss
A common law remedy clearly suited to compensating vic-
tims of sexual harassment is an action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress. The emotional harm that may result
from persistent sexual harassment is severe, even though it is
less tangible than the adverse economic consequences. 02 In
recent years, courts have become increasingly disposed to en-
tertain actions premised on severe emotional distress. Only
one jurisdiction refuses to recognize the cause of action alto-
gether, 03 and many others now allow recovery for mental dis-
tress even when it is unaccompanied by physical contact or
harm.104
The difficulty with recovering under the intentional inflic-
tion of severe emotional distress theory arises from the re-
quirement by most courts that the defendant's conduct be
"extreme and outrageous"'05 if the plaintiff suffers no physical
102. See note 8 supra.
103. See Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 78 N.E.2d 735 (1948).
104. See, e.g., Savage v. Boles, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954); Wilson v. Wil-
kins, 181 Ark. 137, 25 S.W.2d 428 (1930); Boyle v. Chandler, 33 Del. 323, 138 A. 273
(1927); Curnett v. Wolf, 244 Iowa 683, 57 N.W.2d 915 (1953); LaSalle Extension
Univ. v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934). But see, e.g., Clark v. Associ-
ated Retail Credit Men, 105 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores
Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936); Carrigan v. Henderson, 192 Okla. 254, 135
P.2d 330 (1943); Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954).
105. See, e.g., Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 431 F. Supp. 254
(E.D. Pa. 1977), affd, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979); Cornblith v. First Mainte-
nance Supply Co., 268 Cal. App. 2d 564, 74 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1968); Perati v. Atkin-
son, 213 Cal. App. 2d 472, 28 Cal. Rptr. (1963); Paris v. Division of State
Compensation Ins. Fund, 517 P.2d 1353 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973); Pakos v. Clark, 253
Or. 113, 453 P.2d 682 (1969); Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312
(1963). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment d
(1965), which describes the nature of outrageous conduct-
[T]he conduct [must be] so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be re-
garded as atrocious, [and] utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an av-
erage member of the community would arouse his resentment against
the actor, and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!"
It is difficult to discern any factual patterns that courts consider "extreme
and outrageous." The following cases involved employment-related incidents
determined to be outrageous: Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'r, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 496, 468
P.2d 216, 217, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 89 (1970) (cause of action stated by complaint
which alleged that white supervisor shouted at black employee in a "rude, vio-
lent and insolent manner" using racial epithets); Beavers v. Johnson, 112 Ga.
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harm along with the mental distress.106 Therefore, the vitality
of this cause of action depends almost entirely on judicial sen-
sitivity to the true nature of sexual harassment. Acts of sexual
initiative among co-workers or from a supervisor toward a
subordinate may not be recognized as extreme or outrageous
unless courts understand the element of economic coercion in-
volved in sexual harassment.107
The common law rule that there is no harm in asking, i.e.,
that an invitation to illicit intercourse is not sufficiently outra-
geous to be actionable,108 does not necessarily bar recovery for
App. 677, 145 S.E.2d 776 (1965) (cause of action stated by complaint that alleged
that manager accused cashier of stealing funds, threatened to call police if she
did not replace funds, and verbally abused her in other fashions); Agis v. How-
ard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976) (cause of action stated by
complaint alleged that restaurant owner had announced that until persons
stealing from business were discovered, he would fire waitresses in alphabeti-
cal order, beginning with plaintiff). The following cases, however, were held
not to involve outrageous conduct: Cornblith v. First Maintenance Supply Co.,
268 Cal. App. 2d 564, 74 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1968) (following plaintiff's injury in auto
accident, defendant supervisor engaged in a pattern of harassment which
greatly impeded plaintiffs ability to service his accounts); Dowling v. Blue
Cross, Inc., 338 So. 2d 88 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1976) (plaintiffs dismissed from em-
ployment on basis of knowingly false accusation that they had engaged in sex-
ual relations with one another in the ladies' lounge of defendant's building).
One court has recognized the potential for severe mental distress resulting
from a work atmosphere charged with prejudice. In Contreras v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977), plaintiff claimed that he
was subjected to continuous humiliation and embarrassment in the form of ra-
cial slurs and jokes made in his presence by fellow employees during work
hours. The court stated,
Where a person is not free to leave but must remain in physical prox-
imity to others who continually make racial slurs and comments, it is
for the jury to determine both whether this is a factor in making the
claim one of extreme outrage and the extent to which the employer
was or should have been aware of these conditions ....
Id. at 741, 565 P.2d 1176-77.
106. See, e.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'r, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 88 (1970); Perati v. Atkinson, 213 Cal. App. 2d 472, 28 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1963).
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Comment k (1965).
107. A defendant's conduct is more likely to be deemed outrageous if he
abuses some relation or position that entails actual or apparent power to dam-
age a plaintiff's interest. See State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.
2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952) (individual rubbish collector threatened with eco-
nomic ruin and physical harm by rubbish collectors association); Johnson v.
Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 208 N.W. 814 (1926) (young pupil harassed by school
administrators). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, Com-
ment e (1965). Abuse of the employer-employee relationship in particular has
been noted as a significant factor in the outrageousness of a defendant's con-
duct. See, e.g., Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'r, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 88 (1970); Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977); Contreras v.
Crowft Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash. 2d 735, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977).
108. See Davis v. Richardson, 76 Ark. 348, 89 S.W. 318 (1905); Reed v. Maley,
115 Ky. 816, 74 S.W. 1079 (1903); Prince v. Ridge, 32 Misc. 666, 66 N.Y.S. 454
(1900). See generally Magruder, supra note 101, at 1055.
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sexual harassment causing mental distress. Courts have recog-
nized that when aggravating circumstances accompany the in-
vitation, such as when the proposition is repeated to the point
of hounding or involves an indecent exposure, a cause of action
for mental distress may be stated.10 9 Furthermore, at least one
court has indicated its willingness to abandon the common law
rule altogether." 0
Another problem with the cause of action for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress is that courts may be reluctant to
apply it, believing that a harasser may not have intended to
harm his victim. Courts instead may believe that the har-
asser's intent was simply to satisfy his own sexual needs.
There are a number of cases that have involved persistent sex-
ual advances, however, where courts have found the requisite
intent to harm even though the defendants were apparently
acting for their own benefit."' More generally, courts have
found liability where a defendant's actions were intentional, al-
though the particular result, emotional distress, was not." 2
D. THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT
An obvious problem with these common law tort remedies
is that they normally allow recovery only from the primary
tortfeasor. In order to make these actions viable remedies for
victims of sexual harassment, the doctrine of respondeat supe-
109. In Mitran v. Williamson, 21 Misc. 2d 106, 197 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1960), the
court held that a complaint which alleged that defendant repeatedly phoned
plaintiff to suggest that she meet him for illicit sexual purposes, and also sent
her obscene photos of himself, stated a cause of action for mental distress. In
Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961), a complaint that alleged
that defendant repeatedly phoned plaintiff, soliciting her for sex, and that he
once came to plaintiff's home to indecently expose himself, was held sufficient
to state a cause of action for mental distress.
110. In Erwin v. Milligan, 188 Ark. 658, 67 S.W.2d 592 (1934), the court
awarded damages for mental pain and anguish where defendant attempted to
entice plaintiff into illicit sexual relations. Although a technical battery was ev-
ident on the facts, the court did not discuss it as a ground for liability, nor did it
refer to any "aggravating circumstances" that may have accompanied the solici-
tation.
111. See, e.g., Savage v. Boies, 77 Ariz. 355, 272 P.2d 349 (1954); Johnson v.
Woman's Hosp., 527 S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. App. 1975).
112. Some courts have extended liability for mental distress to include con-
duct that is willful, wanton and in reckless disregard of a known risk. See
Boyle v. Chandler, 33 Del. 323, 138 A. 273 (1927); Blakeley v. Shortal's Estate, 236
Iowa 787, 20 N.W.2d 28 (1945); Lindh v. Great N. Ry., 99 Minn. 408, 109 N.W. 823
(1906); Price v. Yellow Pine Paper Mill Co., 240 S.W. 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
But see Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963).
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rior must be expanded to hold employers liable for the miscon-
duct of their employees.
Under common law, an employer is not liable for the tort of
its agent or servant unless the tort was committed while the
agent or servant was acting within the scope of his employ-
ment." 3 Many courts require that for a servant's act to be
within the scope of employment, it must be motivated, at least
in part, by an intent to serve the master."4 This requirement,
if strictly followed, would virtually preclude extending liability
to employers for their employees' acts of sexual harassment,
since it is not clear that an employee is in any way furthering
his employer's interest by sexually victimizing a fellow em-
ployee.
This narrow construction of respondeat superior, however,
has not been universally followed. It has been held that where
a tort was not committed in furtherance of the master's busi-
ness, but "arose out of" the employment, it is "within the scope
of employment."" 5 By definition, on-the-job sexual harassment
arises out of the employment. It is clearly within a supervisor's
scope of employment to make decisions affecting an employee's
job status. When the supervisor threatens to modify those de-
cisions, or actually does, according to the extent of an em-
ployee's sexual cooperation, no sharp line can be drawn to
separate this conduct from his employment." 6 Similarly, the
ability of an employee's co-workers to create a debilitating
work atmosphere through persistent harassment certainly
arises out of the employment. It is only because the employer
has brought workers together in a confined area on a daily ba-
sis that the harassment can be perpetrated." 7
113. See generally 77 C.J.S. Respondeat Superior § 77 (1952).
114. See, e.g., Avery v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 937 (D. Conn. 1977); Tri-
State Coach Corp. v. Walsh, 188 Va. 299, 49 S.E.2d 363 (1948). See generally W.
PROSSER, supra note 89, at 461.
115. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir.
1968). See Carr v. Wm. C. Crowell Co., 28 Cal. 2d 652, 171 P.2d 5 (1946); Hiro-
shima v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 18 Cal. App. 2d 24, 63 P.2d 340 (1936).
116. It is not the illegal, malicious, unauthorized, or negligent act of the
servant which is required to be within the scope of the employment,
... because . . . the master is liable for any such act of the servant
which, if isolated, would not be imputable to the master, but which is
so connected with and immediately grows out of another act of the ser-
vant imputable to the master, that both acts are treated as one indivisi-
ble tort, which, for the purposes of the master's liability, takes its color
and quality from the earlier act.
Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Cobb, 45 S.W.2d 323, 326 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
117.- See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11, 14 (D.C. Cir.
1940) (construing Workmen's Compensation Act). See also Ira S. Bushey &
Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1968); Lundberg v. State, 25
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Holding employers liable for the sexual harassment of their
employees would be consonant with the rationale behind re-
spondeat superior. The employer's liability is not based on
fault, but rather on the notion that
because [the employer has engaged] in an enterprise which will, on
the basis of all past experience, involve harm to others through the
torts of employees, and sought to profit by it, it is just that he, rather
than the innocent injured plaintiff, should bear them; and because he is
better able to absorb them, and to distribute them, through prices,
rates or liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to soci-
ety, to the community at large.118
Both these rationales make it reasonable to hold employers lia-
ble for the tortious acts of sexual harassment perpetrated by
their employees. It is, after all, the employer's personnel struc-
ture that tends to create the coercive environment characteris-
tic of sexual harassment. Furthermore, the employer is in the
best position to establish the employment policies, grievance
procedures, and disciplinary measures necessary to combat the
problem. Finally, it is the employer who can most efficiently
spread the economic loss suffered by individual employees to
the community at large. Thus, there are sound reasons for ex-
tending the doctrine of respondeat superior to legitimize em-
ployer liability for the narrow class of tortious conduct that
comprises on-the-job sexual harassment." 9
E. BREACH OF CONTRACT
When sexual harassment culminates in the dismissal of a
victimized employee, that employee may be able to recover her
resulting economic loss in a suit for breach of contract. An ap-
parent bar to such an action, the common law rule that employ-
ment for an indefinite period of time is absolutely at will, has
been modified by a number of recent decisions that hold that
under certain circumstances, such as where an employee is dis-
N.Y.2d 467, 473, 255 N.E.2d 177, 180, 306 N.Y.S.2d 947, 952 (1969) (Burke, J., dis-
senting).
118. W. PROSSER, supra note 89, at 459.
119. A version of respondeat superior broad enough to encompass such lia-
bility would not be without precedent. See Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United
States, 398 F.2d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 1968) ("a business enterprise cannot justly dis-
claim responsibility for accidents which may fairly be said to be characteristic
of its activities"). Accord, Cruikshank v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 1355, 1358
(D. Hawaii 1977) ('the modern and expanding view is to hold an employer lia-
ble for the intentional torts of his employees if ... it is fair to shift the loss
from the victim to the employer").
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missed in bad faith, an action for breach of contract will lie.120
In Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,121 the plaintiff claimed that her
refusal to date her supervisor resulted in harassment and, ulti-
mately, her dismissal. The court affirmed a jury verdict for
back pay on a breach of contract theory.122
The Monge decision is a significant judicial step toward
eliminating sexual harassment that results in wrongful dis-
charge. Its influence, however, may be somewhat limited.
Some courts have refused to follow the decision,123 and, as with
title VII claims, 124 the victimized employees may be limited to
recovering their consequential economic losses. 125
120. See Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 184, 344 P.2d 25
(1959); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973);
Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977); Monge v.
Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). See also Jackson v. Mini-
doka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977). But see Pirre v. Printing
Devs., Inc., 432 F. Supp. 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 51 Ill. App.
3d 1016, 366 N.E.2d 1141 (1977), rev'd, 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979).
121. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
122. Id. at 552. See also Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d
1251 (Mass. 1977):
We believe that the holding in the Monge case merely extends to em-
ployment contracts the rule that "in every contract there is an implied
covenant that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect
of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the
fruits of the contract, which means that in every contract there exists
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."
Id. at 1257. Other decisions have allowed tort claims for bad faith breaches of
employment contracts. See Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App.
184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d
425 (1973).
123. See, e.g., Pirre v. Printing Devs., Inc., 432 F. Supp. 840 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 366 N.E.2d 1141 1977, rev'd, 74 lL 2d
172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979).
124. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
125. Damages are not normally awarded for mental suffering in breach of
contract actions. See, e.g., Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Henderson, 82 Ariz. 335, 313
P.2d 404 (1957); Dunn & Sons, Inc. v. Paragon Homes of New England, Inc., 110
N.H. 215, 218, 265 A.2d 5, 8 (1970); Martin v. Donald Park Acres at Hastings, Inc.,
54 A.D.2d 975, 389 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1976). See generally 11 S. WELUsTON, A TREATISE
ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS § 1341 (3d ed. 1968). The court in Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 137, 316 A.2d 549, 552 (1974), relied on this rule to re-
duce the plaintiffs award by the amount attributable to mental suffering.
This rule, however, is not without exceptions. Courts have allowed dam-
ages for mental suffering where the contract comprehends benefits other than
those that are purely pecuniary, such as contracts for undertaking services, see
Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal. App. 2d 480, 196 P.2d 915 (1948); Lamm v. Shingleton,
231 N.C. 10, 55 S.E.2d 810 (1949), contracts for support of a relative, see Alabama
Water Serv. Co. v. Wakefield, 231 Ala. 112, 163 So. 626 (1935), Westervelt v. Mc-
Cullough, 68 Cal. App. 198, 228 P. 734 (1924), contracts for performance of medi-
cal services, see Stewart v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957), and
contracts for insurance coverage, see Eckenrode v. Life of America Ins. Co., 470
F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1972), Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d
173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (1967). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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F. SummARY
Liberal use of the common law remedies described above
could provide the flexibility needed to combat sexual harass-
ment in employment. None of the actions would depend upon
a judicial finding that the challenged conduct amounted to
gender based discrimination.126 Moreover, a particular charge,
or combination of charges, could be tailored to the factual cir-
cumstances of almost any case.127 Finally, under these theo-
ries, victims of sexual harassment could be adequately
compensated, since damages for mental distress would be
available. However, one general problem exists with these
common law remedies. The utility of each cause of action is de-
pendent on liberal judicial interpretations of the requisite ele-
ments, and of the damages that may be awarded. Judicial
conservatism in this area would certainly retard progress to-
ward recompensing victims through the common law.
IV. FURTHER STATUTORY REGULATION
Development of further statutory prohibitions against sex-
ual harassment should be pursued because the continued vital-
ity of the title VII cause of action is questionable, and because
the adaptation of common law remedies to sexual harassment
problems may require years of litigation. These new statutory
prohibitions should arise on two fronts. First, at the federal
level, title VII should be amended to provide expressly that
sexual harassment constitutes gender-based discrimination in
violation of the Act. Second, uniform state legislation similar to
CoNRAcTs § 367 (Tent. Draft No. 14, 1979) ("recovery for emotional disturbance
will be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the breach is of
such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely re-
sult"). The wrongful discharge of an employee because of her refusal to submit
to sexual advances is much more akin to the cases where mental suffering is to
be expected, see id., than to purely commercial transactions where the general
rule against damages for mental suffering is rigorously followed. Furthermore,
courts may be more willing to award damages for mental suffering if the action
for breach of contract also sounds in tort. See Eckenrode v. Life of America
Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972); Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510
P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Richardson v. Employers Liability Assur-
ance Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232, 102 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1972); Crisci v. Security Ins.
Co., 66 Cal. App. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
126. See text accompanying notes 58-87 supra.
127. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89
Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970); Northrup v. Miles Homes, Inc., 204 N.W.2d 850 (Iowa 1973);
Hess v. Jarboe, 201 Kan. 705, 443 P.2d 294 (1968).
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the Model Statute proposed below should be promulgated in
order to provide expedited relief to sexual harassment victims.
A. AN AMENDMENT TO TITLE VI
The most serious problem with the title VII cause of action
for sexual harassment-the necessity for a finding of gender-
based discrimination-is also the problem that could be most
easily remedied by statutory amendment.128 As noted previ-
ously, 29 it is unclear whether the Supreme Court will find that
sexual harassment is gender-based discrimination violative of
title VII. Congressional action is necessary, therefore, to bring
sexual harassment expressly within the purview of the Civil
Rights Act, and to encourage further title VII litigation of sex-
ual harassment claims.
One state, Wisconsin, has taken a similar step by extending
its antidiscrimination statute to cover on-the-job sexual harass-
ment. A 1977 amendment to its Fair Employment Act specifi-
cally provides that conditioning employment-related decisions
on consent to sexual favors constitutes prohibited sex discrimi-
nation.130
Congress has already demonstrated its willingness to ex-
plicitly define behavior that constitutes gender-based discrimi-
nation by amending title VII to cover pregnancy-related
issues.' 31 Other such action should be taken, constituting an
128. Some of the problems with the title VII cause of action, see text accom-
panying notes 17-87 supra, call for a more liberal judicial interpretation of stat-
utory language rather than statutory amendment. For example, the phrase
"term or condition," see text accompanying notes 17-27 supra, is at the heart of
many diverse factual issues, and a comprehensive statutory definition of the
phrase would be virtually impossible as well as unnecessarily inflexible. Simi-
larly, the issue of whether a court should impose vicarious liability on an em-
ployer for the discriminatory acts of his employees is probably best treated on
a case-by-case basis with attention given to the particular facts involved.
Extending the remedies provided by title VII to include compensatory re-
lief, however, is a secondary problem that is amenable to treatment by statu-
tory amendment.
129. See text accompanying notes 58-87 upra.
130. The amendment states that it shall be considered discrimination based
on sex "[f]or any employer, labor organization, licensing agency or person to
make hiring, employment, admission, licensure, compensation, promotion or
job assignments contingent upon a person's consent to sexual contact or sexual
intercourse." Act of May 8, 1978, 1977 Wis. LAws 1236, ch. 286 § 3 (codified at
Wis. STAT. § 111.32(5) (g) (4) (1979)). The amendment also extended unemploy-
ment benefits to employees who quit their jobs because of sexual harassment.
See Act of May 8, 1978, 1977 Wis. LAws 1236, ch. 286 § 1 (codified at Wis. STAT.
§ 108.04(7) (i) (1979)).
131. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
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express declaration of national public policy against sexual har-
assment.
B. A MODEL STATE STATUTE
A Bill for An Act Prohibiting Sexual Harassment in Employment
(a) It shall be unlawful for any employer, labor organization, li-
censing agency, or person to make any hiring, employment, admission,
licensure, compensation, promotion, or job assignment decision contin-
gent upon a person's consent to sexual contact,1 3 2 or to fail to prevent
any employee from being subjected to persistent, unreciprocated sex-
ual advances from or sexual intimidation by supervisory personnel or
other employees and agents.
(b) Any person aggrieved by a violation of this chapter may,
within six months after the occurence of the violation, fie a verified
charge with the State Commission on Human Rights,1 3 3 setting forth
the details of the practice complained of, and other such information as
the Commission may require. The Commission shall serve a copy of
the charge upon the defendant within five days of such filing. The de-
fendant may, prior to the hearing provided for in subdivision (c), fie an
answer denying, excusing, or justifying the alleged violation.
(c) Within sixty days of the filing of the charge, a hearing shall be
held by a hearing officer designated to handle complaints under this
Act. The hearing officer shall make findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and publicize the same. If the officer finds that a violation of sub-
division (a) has occurred, the officer shall issue an order directing the
defendant to cease and desist from the violative conduct, and may or-
der the defendant to pay the aggrieved party punitive damages in an
amount not less than $25 or more than $500.
(d) Anyone found guilty of repeatedly violating this Act may be
subject to such greater civil penalties as are necessary in the judgment
of the hearing officer, to effectuate the purposes of this Act.
(e) The court may award attorney's fees and court costs to the
prevailing party in any action brought under this Act.
(f) Nothing in this Act shall preclude an aggrieved person from
proceeding under federal or common law.
The Model Statute is designed to provide expedited relief
in state courts for victims of sexual harassment. Expeditious
treatment of such claims is essential, given the emotionally
charged nature of sexual harassment situations. Furthermore,
speedy procedures are desirable since a lengthy trial, replete
with testimony regarding years of discriminatory practices, sta-
tistical proof, and so forth, is simply not necessary to correct
132. This language is taken from the 1977 amendment to the Wisconsin Fair
Employment Act, see note 130 supra, except that the phrase "sexual contact"
has been substituted for "sexual intercourse." This substitution is meant to
make the statutory action for sexual harassment capable of redressing the vari-
ous situations where sexual harassment is present even though no explicit de-
mand for sexual intercourse has been made.
133. The name of the state agency empowered to enforce the state's antidis-
crimination laws should be inserted here.
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the problem. Generally, under the Model State Statute, it will
be necessary to have testimony only from the victim, the de-
fendant, and perhaps from corroborating witnesses.
The prescribed penalties under the Model State Statute are
limited, but they will deter particular instances of sexual ha-
rassment and educate employers, employees, and the public in
general. If the penalties were made more severe, state legisla-
tures might be reluctant to enact them since sexual harass-
ment does not engender a high level of opprobrium from all
strata of society. The hearing officer, however, would be ac-
corded sufficient discretion to impose more severe penalties
when repeated violations were involved. Finally, the Model
State Statute makes clear that in appropriate cases, litigants
are free to pursue title VII suits, and recover greater damages,
or to bring suits based on common law. Thus, victims of sexual
harassment will be accorded the proper measure of freedom to
pursue the remedy most clearly suited to their needs and to
the factual circumstances of their cases.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts now recognize that on-the-job sexual harassment is
a severe problem, and occasionally allow victims to recover
under title VII of the Civil Rights Act. As it currently stands,
however, the title VII cause of action suffers from serious de-
fects. The first is that courts have restricted its application to a
narrow set of factual situations that together comprise only a
fraction of the incidents constituting sexual harassment. An-
other problem is that many of the injuries commonly suffered
by sexual harassment victims are not compensable under the
Act. A third defect in the title VII cause of action is that the
-A makes no provision for imposing vicarious liability on em-
ployers for sexual harassment perpetrated by their employees.
The final, and most distressing, problem with the title VII sex-
ual harassment theory, however, is that it appears to run afoul
of the gender-based discrimination doctrine evolving in the
Supreme Court.
Some of these defects can be cured by the common law ac-
tions of assault and battery; a relatively recent tort cause of ac-
tion, the intentional infliction of emotional distress theory is
particularly well-suited to recompensing certain injuries not
covered by title VII. Moreover, breach of contract theory may
provide new avenues of relief as courts become more sensitive
to the economic pressures underlying on-the-job sexual harass-
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ment. These common law theories do not, however, resolve the
respondeat superior problem created in situations where the
harasser is a lower-echelon employee.
The best solution to the inadequacies of current sexual
harassment theories appears to be further statutory treatment.
Title VII should be amended to define sexual harassment as a
form of gender-based discrimination. Furthermore, states
should enact specific legislation to provide expedited relief to
victims of sexual harassment. This response is the least that
should be expected from legislatures given the conservative ap-
proach courts have taken to this long-standing problem.

